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Abstract—Blockchain is a disruptive technology that
has been characterised to be the next big thing and has
already gained a broad recognition by experts in diverse
fields. In this paper, we consider possible use cases and
applications of the blockchain for the consumer electronics
(CE) industry and its interplay with the Internet of things.
Instead of discussing how the blockchain can revolutionise
the supply chain, we focus on how it could be employed
for enhancing the security of networked CE devices. This
work is motivated by the large number of recent attacks
that use easily hackable devices as a weaponry. Towards
this direction, privacy and data protection aspects of
blockchain solutions are also presented and are linked to
regulatory framework provisions. Information on existing
blockchain solutions is also provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE vision of the Internet of things (IoT) is toestablish a whole new ecosystem that is comprised
of heterogeneous connected devices communicating to
deliver environments that make the way we do business,
communicate, and live far more intelligent [3]. In the
following years, almost anything in the surrounding
environment will be interconnected with billions of other
devices, as part of a network of networks. Examples
of IoT devices include sensors and embedded devices
in buildings, industrial control systems, etc., as well as,
consumer electronics (CE) devices, like digital cameras,
TVs, computers, and smartphones [13].
The technological and industrial revolution brought by
the IoT could be amplified if combined with blockchain
solutions [2]. The blockchain, which is the data structure
underlying the Bitcoin, provides a verifiable process for
storing transactions or digital assets, on an immutable
shared ledger, in a way that it is transparent, secure,
and robust (see Fig. 1); every transaction is accompa-
nied by an auditable proof that is valid and has been
accepted and mutually agreed by the nodes. The adoption
of blockchain, or distributed ledger technology (DLT),
in IoT would allow devices to act autonomously and
execute transactions via smart contracts. Thus, beyond its
use in cryptocurrencies, the blockchain has the potential
to impact other industries, like healthcare and CE [7].
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Fig. 1. Main advantages of blockchain/distributed ledger technology.
The above technological evolution comes with new
forms of threats or attacks that exploit the complexity
and heterogeneity of IoT networks, therefore rendering
security amongst the most important aspects of a net-
worked world [8]. The fact that the number of intelligent
things has greatly increased in the last few years, and will
continue to do so, amplifies concerns about the security
of networked devices, applications, and services. These
often constitute the target of attackers, since they may
easily exploit well-known vulnerabilities to accomplish
their objectives, e.g. gain unauthorised access to the
device, steal sensitive data, deny services to legitimate
users, and use it as a vehicle to launch other advanced
attacks. Thus, there is an urgent need for securing the
communications among untrusted devices to allow them
establish trust and operate transparently.
In this paper, we investigate whether the blockchain
could enhance the security of IoT-enabled CE devices in
a cryptographically verifiable manner. In particular:
• we further explore novel security and privacy appli-
cations of the blockchain in the IoT domain, which
have recently been recognised [11];
• we illustrate how cyber-security attacks tampering
CE devices’ critical files can be mitigated using the
blockchain as an independent root-of-trust;
• we describe how integrity data on the blockchain
can be leveraged to define a trust-based framework
for coordination between IoT devices;
• we link blockchain solutions’ privacy and data pro-
tection aspects to regulatory framework provisions.
The above new paradigm, driven by the blockchain, can
bring the transparency and auditing needed for trusting
3online services without a trusted third party (TTP).
Although the potential applications of blockchain in
the IoT are extensively explored, the area of using it
for strengthening IoT security and privacy or addressing
cyber-security needs is still in its infancy. Many chal-
lenges remain to be tackled so as to build blockchain-
based solutions for the IoT, including processing power,
storage, and scalability. The fact that data stored on the
blockchain cannot change and are public, raises even
more challenges: data confidentiality, the need for long-
term security, and the right to be forgotten.
II. HOW THE BLOCKCHAIN WORKS
The blockchain was introduced with Bitcoin as part of
a solution to tackle, in a distributed fashion, the double-
spending problem in a trustless network of peers. The
solution relies on cryptographic mechanisms that ensure
the immutability of data stored on the ledger; a security
through transparency approach is taken, according to
which all nodes’ transactions are public, and thus anyone
can verify their validity. The transactions are digitally
signed with the owner’s private key and are verified with
the associated public key. New transactions are packed
into blocks, containing links to past transactions (thus
creating a chain of blocks), and they are subsequently
appended to the structure. The ledger’s maintenance is
carried out by the nodes called miners [12]. The mutual
agreement on the validity of newly created blocks is done
according to a consensus protocol.
Blockchain and IoT considerations
The design of a blockchain solution for securing IoT
devices is not trivial. In most cases, a device’s resources
are highly constrained, whilst there is a need for per-
forming transactions at high speed. These requirements
call for efficient blockchain solutions; key design factors
that determine both their security and performance, in the
context of the IoT, are briefly presented below.
Modelling: Depending on whether the ledger is open
to the public, i.e. it can be used by all network nodes, it
is classified as public or private. Moreover, if the miners
that maintain the ledger have been selected a priori, then
the ledger is called permissioned; otherwise, if any node
can be a miner, the ledger is said to be unpermissioned.
In an IoT security scenario, the blockchain that should
be designed needs not necessarily be universal; in fact,
there may be many local and global blockchains with
different purposes; the use of sidechains could also prove
to be efficient in certain cases. The model to be used in
each case depends on security, scalability, performance,
and other critical for the IoT scenario requirements.
There are trade-offs between the above criteria: a private
blockchain with less users could minimise the integrity
verification time and enjoy almost immediate tamper
resistance and detection; on the other hand, this choice
reduce security, since we rely on less nodes to maintain
the data structure.
Consensus: There are many consensus protocols that
have been proposed. Their goal is to allow nodes agree
on a single version of valid transactions. The proof of
work (PoW) and proof of stake (PoS) protocols are the
most prominent examples; see e.g. [12] for more details.
The processing power that PoW consensus algorithms
require to be devoted can be adjusted to the application
needs in order to meet performance requirements. It is
clear that lowering the hardness of the computational
puzzle to solve also impacts the security offered. Hence,
an optimal balance should be found if PoW is to be used
in blockchain-based IoT applications.
Smart contracts: These are computer scripts that are
stored in, and are automatically executed by, a distributed
ledger once they are triggered [2]. They are an important
part of blockchain-based IoT applications, where IoT de-
vices are expected to be highly autonomous and transact
based on some predefined criteria.
III. NEED FOR SECURING IOT-ENABLED DEVICES
Security and privacy are increasingly important factors
for the acceptance of IoT products and services. There
are many recent attacks that exploit IoT devices to per-
form distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, to spy
on people, and hijack communication links, delivering
full control of anything that is remotely accessible to
an attacker. Recent reports indicate that DDoS, cloud-
based, and mobile attacks are among the most common
attacks. The availability of botnets-for-hire has led to
the noticeable increase in DDoS attacks and it is highly
likely that the IoT will further facilitate the formation of
such botnet armies. A recent example of DDoS attack in
Oct. 2016, attributed to Mirai botnet, affected millions
of users and companies, also crippling the servers of
popular services, like Twitter, Netflix, and PayPal; this
simple malware infected the IoT devices that used default
settings and credentials.
Most of the security issues arise from devices with
flawed design or poor configuration, which allows at-
tackers to easily compromise them [4]. Tools such as
Shodan and IoTseeker can be easily employed to dis-
cover such vulnerable devices. This brings the important
question of how can large-scale exploitation of such
vulnerabilities be prevented, as IoT devices have very
limited capacity for securing themselves; they cannot be
equipped with the operating systems or the multitude of
4security mechanisms available on a desktop computer.
Moreover, a software update method to fix vulnerabilities
and update configuration settings is often overlooked
by manufacturers, vendors, and others on the supply
chain. Further, even if such functionality is given, there
is often no efficient way to patch those devices, and the
possibility to add new vulnerabilities exists.
Many best practices have been developed in order to
address these issues. As an example, the online trust
alliance (OTA) published an IoT trust framework for
the CE devices, whose recommendations have technical
counterparts that have been widely recognised to be
the cornerstone towards securing the IoT. Among these
security solutions, the following are priority controls to
implement for enhancing attack prevention:
• manage efficiently the hardware devices;
• develop an inventory of authorised software;
• protect the configurations of CE devices;
• perform continuous vulnerability assessment;
• protect sensitive data and users’ privacy.
Building and managing vulnerability profiles, possibly
with the involvement of manufacturers [6], could assure
consumers that security and privacy issues are addressed
seriously. Realising the above is far from trivial and
blockchain may prove to be ideal in this direction.
IV. PLACING TRUST ON THE BLOCKCHAIN
Current centralised security solutions are not adequate
for dealing with the waves of attacks and the heterogene-
ity of the IoT devices. The following analysis leads to the
conclusion that blockchain can be used to achieve trusted
decentralised coordination among IoT devices and help
defending against sophisticated attacks. It is expected to
define a fundamentally new approach to security, going
beyond the device’s security alone, to include [6]:
• Identity security: blocking identity theft, disallow-
ing successful use of rogue public-key certificates,
countering man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks.
• Data security: preventing data tampering, develop-
ing access control mechanisms and keyless signa-
ture infrastructures (KSI) on the blockchain.
• Communication security:, protecting domain name
system (DNS) services, stopping DDoS attacks,
defending critical information infrastructures.
Specifically, the security through transparency approach
of a public blockchain has clear advantages for the IoT
compared to the usual security through obscurity model.
Can devices’ integrity be protected?
Attacks on connected smart devices aim at impacting
their operational integrity so that they do not strictly
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Fig. 2. The blockchain functions as a distributed ledger, for various
IoT transactions enhancing the security of IoT-enabled CE devices.
function within their specified usage. For lightweight
devices, lacking proper defence mechanisms, critical
information of a manufacturer’s IoT device operation
could be recorded on the blockchain so that it can be later
queried (see Fig. 2) when e.g. a verification of proper
functioning is needed, or when software parts have to
be updated reliably [2]. Thus, multiple aspects, such as
• device’s firmware;
• operating system and critical software;
• system/network configuration files;
• audit and event logs;
could be verified against a history of previously valid
states, to ensure their integrity. Such information could
be monitored on a continual basis for illicit changes.
This approach fits well within the current practices of the
software distributors that publish their software binaries’
hash to allow users verify the authenticity of their copy
[10]. Although preserving integrity alone cannot possibly
thwart attacks targeting at other security properties, like
availability, it sets the ground for establishing a trusted
execution environment for the implemented security con-
trols and services. To enhance security in IoT-enabled
CE devices, the following phases during their life-cycle
should be considered as shown in Fig. 2.
Registration: When assembled, a product is registered
into a blockchain, linking its cryptographic fingerprint to
an entry in the blockchain.
Update: Upon change, e.g. firmware update, a new
fingerprint is generated and submitted to the network
of peers who will insert the fingerprint into their local
copies via a consensus algorithm.
Verification: At any point, nodes can verify a device’s
properties by regenerating the fingerprint and comparing
this value against the (correct) entry in the blockchain.
Can devices establish mutual trust?
As already noted in [2], information on the blockchain
can be leveraged to allow devices establish trust relations
5that are achieved as an emergent property from their in-
teractions. In principle, trust is a complex notion related
to the belief on the security, integrity, reliability, and
other aspects of a device. There is no universal definition
of trust, but it can be perceived as the expectation that
a device will behave correctly for some specific purpose
and will pose no threats or risks to any other parties
involved; both objective (e.g. vulnerabilities’ exposure,
integrity status, etc.) and subjective (e.g. recommen-
dations or reputations) measurements contribute to its
computation [15]. Focusing on security and integrity
aspects of IoT devices, one could consider the following
objective measurements towards evaluating a device’s
trust score:
• Have critical files or firmware been tampered with?
• Have the latest software patches been installed?
• Is the IoT device exposed to known vulnerabilities?
• Is the network traffic being generated typical?
To accurately answer the above, the state-of-the-art in
many security areas has to be combined. Implementing
controls for monitoring a device’s behaviour so as to
protect users’ privacy is a significant open problem
for IoT-enabled CE devices. The manufacturer’s usage
description (MUD) specifications can be adopted for
enforcing operational usage compliance and block sus-
picious connections or services.
Practices that utilise such information in a gen-
eral reputation-based setting are ideally combined with
blockchain solutions due to their transparency and their
ability to be regulated by the whole network of peers.
This approach is along the same lines with the imple-
mentation of CE device blacklisting, but much more
sophisticated than that, which has been suggested as the
protection means by network operators against devices
being ultimately untrusted (e.g. stolen mobile phones).
Likewise, blockchain solutions, by relying on smart con-
tracts, can facilitate the wide adoption of such practices.
How secure is the blockchain?
Research on blockchains’ potential applications in the
security area has been growing. There have been propos-
als for using blockchain in the form of cryptocurrencies
alternative to bitcoin (they are called altcoins) or as
the core structure accompanied by some application-
tailored consensus protocol. Examples include decen-
tralised access-control management systems, where users
own and control their personal data, binary and certificate
transparency systems [10], and cryptocurrencies to allow
a device proving having contributed to a DDoS attack
against a specific target. The security of these proposals,
wherever rigorously treated, depends on the assumptions
TABLE I
MALICIOUS ATTACKS TO BLOCKCHAIN AND DEFENSES [14].
Attack Definition Defensive measures
Double
spending
Many payments are made with a
body of funds
Complexity of mining
process
Record
hacking
Blocks are modified – fraudulent
transactions are inserted
Distributed consensus
51%
attack
Miner with more than half of the
network’s computational power,
dominating verification process
Detection methods and
design of incentives
Identity
theft
An entity’s private key is stolen Reputation blockchain
on identities
System
hacking
Software systems that implement
a blockchain are compromised
Advanced intrusion de-
tection systems
made about the security of the underlying blockchain
data structure. However, it is now well-understood that
a holistic security analysis must consider cryptographic
(primitives employed), software (smart contracts), and
game-theoretic (incentives) aspects.
From the cryptographic viewpoint, blockchain’s prop-
erties have been well-studied due to the attention gained
by Bitcoin. Persistence and liveness are critical prop-
erties for blockchain security, i.e. to prevent adversaries
from performing a selective DDoS attack against account
holders or mining pools; it is known that these cannot
hold if more than 1/2 of the miners in a synchronous
network are selfish (i.e. they do not follow the protocol)
—known as the 51% attack. This threshold has been
subsequently revised, using a game-theoretic approach,
to letting an adversary’s hashing power be less than
about 1/3 of the network’s total hashing power. Since
the assumption on fully synchronous networks (absence
of any delays in message delivery) that is often made is
unrealistic, research focuses on asynchronous networks
to study blockchain solutions’ security. A synopsis of
main attacks is given in Table I.
Although it is hard to modify data in a blockchain, it
is possible to compromise software systems implement-
ing the technology; the hack of Mt. Gox, resulting in
$450 million losses, is such a notable example. Another
incident is related to the decentralized autonomous or-
ganization (DAO), holding a large percentage of Ether;
it suffered ∼$60 million in losses when a smart contract
vulnerability was exploited that blocked the invocation
of the function updating a user’s balance; a summary
of such vulnerabilities in smart contracts is provided in
Table II. Many of these vulnerabilities apply to Solidity,
the high-level language supported by Ethereum.
V. PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION ASPECTS
Although blockchain is being considered as a some-
how anonymous data structure, privacy properties in this
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TAXONOMY OF VULNERABILITIES IN SMART CONTRACTS [9].
Vulnerability Cause Level
Call to unknown The called function doesn’t exist Contract’s
Out-of-gas send Fallback of the callee is executed source code
Exception disorder Exception handling irregularity
Type casts Contract execution type-check error
Re-entrance flaw Function re-entered prior exit
Field disclosure Private value published by miner
Immutable bug Contract altering after deployment EVM
Ether lost Send ether to orphan address bytecode
Unpredicted state Contract state change prior call Blockchain
Randomness bug Seed biased by malicious miner mechanism
Timestamp failure Malicious miner alters timestamp
context have never been formally stated in a provable
way. Privacy can be considered as the right of an indi-
vidual to control how personal information is obtained,
processed, distributed, or used by others; i.e. it is related
to personal data processing. The term personal data
refers to information relating to an identified or iden-
tifiable natural person —a person who can be identified,
directly or indirectly. However, to determine whether a
natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of
all the means reasonably likely to be used for identifying
the natural person directly or indirectly. Hence, personal
data having undergone pseudonymisation that could be
attributed to a natural person by using additional infor-
mation, should be considered to be personal data.
In the case of incorporating blockchains in IoT tech-
nologies, the IoT devices will exchange data via the dis-
tributed ledger and smart contracts. In this scenario, each
device can be singled out, roughly resulting in device fin-
gerprinting as each device leaves a unique trace. Hence,
if a device is associated with an individual, then personal
data processing is in place. The above are in accordance
with the European general data protection regulation
(GDPR) EU 2016/679 stating that pseudonymisation
should not be considered as anonymization, though it
reduces the risks to the data subjects concerned. The
GDPR is expected to apply to the majority of organisa-
tions, even if they lack establishments in the EU, if the
subjects whose data are processed reside in the EU.
Thus, personal data protection issues in the blockchain
are related to pseudonymisation and other privacy en-
hancing technologies that reduce privacy risks, like
users’ behaviour profiling without their consent. Clearly,
the specific context of the blockchain under consider-
ation is crucial for determining the associated risks;
these are higher in permissionless ledgers, where anyone
can view the whole history of transactions. Several
approaches for mitigating privacy issues have been pro-
posed, where the majority concerns cryptocurrencies.
However, these may also apply appropriately adjusted to
blockchain for IoT security, as their goal is to avoid hav-
ing user information revealed; monitoring users’ activi-
ties for profiling purposes through automated decision-
making tools is a typical example that poses significant
risks for individuals’ rights and freedoms.
The use of mixing schemes is a privacy enhancing
approach where many users’ transactions are mixed; As
the need for a third party raises security issues, effort has
been put to get mixing schemes operating in a transparent
and verifiable way [1]. In any case, the privacy obtained
by such schemes needs to be evaluated since partial
information leakage still occurs. Another approach rests
with zero knowledge (ZK) proofs; the ZK succinct non-
interactive argument of knowledge (zkSNARK) is a
particular ZK proof that does not necessitate the inter-
action between provers and verifiers. This tool has been
proposed for achieving anonymity in the blockchain —
with Zerocash system being an example. Its main idea is
that a transaction’s creator can prove that the transaction
is true without revealing sender’s or receiver’s address
and the transaction amount. A more recent approach is
the design of a privacy preserving distributed file storage
system relying on the blockchain for handling funds
with financial incentives given to storage providers [5];
a privacy preserving payment mechanism, based on ring
signatures, and one-time addresses are at the core of
system’s design. Although the above approaches mainly
target at the financial sector, the mathematical tools they
are based on could be possibly applied, as stated above,
to blockchain applications for the IoT industry; besides,
such approaches have already been studied in many other
frameworks, like e-voting and anonymous routing. In any
case, it is clear that privacy issues are not fully resolved
and further research is needed.
Another challenge that blockchain applications may
need to address, to ensure compliance with the regulatory
framework, is how to erase personal data from the ledger
when a user revokes consent (if applicable) for such pro-
cessing; this is referred to as the right to be forgotten in
the GDPR. Towards this end, a number of solutions could
be considered. For instance, the blockchain can contain
the transactions’ hash values and not the transactions
themselves, which could be stored separately; deleting
the separate transactions seems to address the right to
be forgotten without affecting the overall solution.
VI. CURRENT MARKET SITUATION
Several industry players have delivered blockchain
solutions that aim at strengthening IoT. The partnership
of IBM and Samsung led to the autonomous decen-
tralised P2P telemetry (ADEPT) platform. In particular,
7Ethereum was used for device coordination, delivering
functions like registration, authentication and consensus-
based blacklisting. Gladious recently proposed an ap-
proach for mitigating DDoS attacks using blockchain,
where pools of nodes are dynamically formed (via
Ethereum’s smart contracts) to validate requested con-
nections and block malicious activity. Other blockchain
security tools for the IoT, like Factom, Filament, and
Guardtime, have been developed focusing on safeguard-
ing the integrity of system components.
The vast number of applications that can benefit from
the blockchain leads to diverse requirements that cannot
be met by a particular choice of DLT model or consensus
protocol. The Hyperledger project, which is hosted by
the Linux foundation, is a collaborative effort aiming
at creating open-source DLT frameworks that will be
the basis for building blockchain solutions. Amongst
the developed frameworks, Hyperledger Fabric provides
the components needed to address the heterogeneity of
the IoT, meet user needs and easily deploy enterprise
grade applications. Implementing a global ledger of
public IoT devices requires first solving the scalability
problem that is related to the price of a public blockchain
transaction and storage. Private blockchains still have
the advantage that they allow common management of
a shared infrastructure with no need for a third-party.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
IoT devices have a reputation for being critically
vulnerable with a collective power allowing them to im-
pact targets beyond a typical attacks’ scope. Blockchain
seems to offer the tools needed for enhancing the security
of IoT devices and address key challenges. The ability
to define a framework for trusted transaction processing
and coordination will allow IoT devices to communicate
with the increased transparency and auditing. However,
as blockchain products are being developed, compliance
with the data privacy regulatory framework need also be
taken into account, as it may affect important aspects of
an envisaged solution.
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